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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to review political and material deprivation as a basis for social 
protest during the pre – revolution period in Georgia, within the framework of Relative Deprivation 
theory. The linkage between relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient, as well type of existing 
political regime and Soviet past is considered. The originality of this paper is conditioned by the new 
approach to Colour Revolutions, forgotten concept of Relative Deprivation is revisited and applied to 
the Rose Revolution in order to explain, why individuals decided to join demonstrations, as previous 
studies are considered a precondition for comprehending social protest against rigged elections, either 
the lack of democracy. This research is based on a qualitative research methodology, the basic 
methodological approach being the method of the case study. Among with in – depth interviews 
based on projective techniques with respondents grouped according to their attitudes towards Rose 
Revolution, quantitative data of World Bank and Freedom House coefficients are also reviewed. 
Empirical analysis of interviews proves the existence of political and material deprivation between 
social groups for the research period. This research shows the methodological value of Relative 
Deprivation to explain social movement motivation for the Rose Revolution in Georgia. 
Keywords: Colour Revolutions; Relative Deprivation; Social Inequality; Hybrid Regime 
 
Introduction 
1.1. Relative Deprivation and Individual Decision to Protest 
This paper contributes to better understanding of causes Colour Revolutions in Post 
– Soviet space. It specifically deals with the case of Rose Revolution – peaceful 
change of Government in Georgia in 2003. The Colour Revolutions are mostly 
approached from the top – down perspective, or how aging ruling elites, either 
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failed to accommodate new generation of political challengers or to satisfy growing 
public demands (see the chapter below). 
This paper provides rather different perspective, departing from structural level and 
paying more attention to agents. The central question of the paper is to understand 
why and how individuals decided to participate in revolutions? In other words, 
what are their personal motivations to engage in peaceful however illegal (from 
perspective of incumbent regimes) activities. The mobilization effect of elites is 
obvious and their access to resources is crucial for mass political participation to 
occur. However, it does not tell us why particular individuals feel attached to mass 
protests and why they made their individual decisions. 
In this paper we revisit the somehow forgotten concept of the Relative Deprivation 
and apply it to the case of the Rose Revolution. 
In our understanding, the relative deprivation is instrumental to understand, why 
individuals participated in mass protests in Georgia in 2003. 
The concept of relative deprivation was elaborated in late 1940ies. It is 
commonplace to use relative deprivation explicitly or implicitly as a central 
variable in the explanation of social movements, and thus also to explain the 
process of social change that are engendered by social movement. In turn, social 
movements are thought to emerge and flourish when groups of persons experience 
relative deprivation. (Morrison, 1971, pp. 675 – 690) 
In the area of social movement research relative deprivation concept was 
commonly used till 1980ies, subsequently, was replaced by resource mobilization 
concept. In 1990ies forgotten concept of relative deprivation was reintegrated 
among theories of collective behavior. 
Relative deprivation explains numerous paradoxes by universal means – people’s 
reactions on objective circumstances depend on their subjective comparisons 
(Walker & Heather, 2002, pp. 321 – 324). 
1.2. Definition of Relative Deprivation 
Relative deprivation is defined as a perception of difference by a person, between 
expectations (status and welfare, what a person believes he/she deserves) and 
existence when comparing themselves to others. (Gurr, 2005, pp. 30-31) 
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A person feels relatively deprived of X when: he/she does not have X; he/she sees 
another person or other people, who may consider themselves as having X 
unexpectedly (whether or not this is, or will be in fact the case); he/she wants X; he 
sees it feasible to have X. (Yitzhaki, 1979, p. 321) 
Gurr posits that relative deprivation is the anger or distress that results from a 





Where RD stands for “relative deprivation,” VE stands for “value expectations,” 
and VC stands for “value capabilities.” Value expectations are the goods and 
opportunities, which people want and to which they feel entitled; value capabilities 
are the goods and opportunities, which they have or think it feasible to attain. Gurr 
identifies three patterns of deprivation: aspirational [Figure 1], decremental [Figure 
2], and progressive [Figure 3]. Aspirational deprivation occurs when value 
capabilities remain constant over time while value expectations increase. 
Decremental deprivation occurs when value capabilities decrease over time while 
value expectations remain constant. In progressive deprivation, value capabilities 
decrease while value expectations increase (Crosby, 1979, p. 107). 
 
Figure 1. Aspirational Deprivation 




Figure 2. Decremental Deprivation 
 
Figure 3. Progressive Deprivation 
Gurr wrote a widely cited book titled “Why Men Rebel” that largely ignores social 
psychological work and the fact that relative deprivation is a phenomenon of 
individuals – not societies. He employed such gross macro – level measures of 
relative deprivation as economic and political indices of whole societies. Although 
“Why Men Rebel” uncovered interesting findings, it is not an relative deprivation 
study (Gurney & Tierney, 1982, p. 35). 
Relative deprivation is not only an economic form of deprivation, but social 
psychology also defines it by measurable reactions, such as social protest, a sense 
of discrimination and injustice. Some who suffer the status disequilibrium, their 
success in some areas is not matched by equal success in other areas, actually 
become withdrawn, alienated from the system they may silently blame, doubtful of 
their own personal abilities, beset by feelings of hopelessness regarding theirs and 
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the system’s future. These are not, however, the persons who tend to join protests. 
What little empirical data point to the fact that persons who do join such protests 
have quite high hopes for the future; that compared to those of similar status who 
do not participate, those who do participate have a higher regard for their own 
personal capabilities and personal efficacy (Arora, 1971, p. 347). 
Following Stouffer, relative deprivation can be defined as a judgment that one or 
one’s in-group is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent, this judgment 
invokes feelings of angry resentment. In addition to the fundamental feature that 
the concept operates at the level of individuals, relative deprivation involves three 
psychological processes: (a) People first make cognitive comparisons, (b) they next 
make cognitive appraisals that they or their ingroup are disadvantaged, and finally 
(c) these disadvantages are seen as unfair and arouse angry resentment. If any one 
of these three requirements is missing, relative deprivation is not operating. (Smith, 
Pettigrew, & Pippin, 2012, p. 205) 
It connects the individual with the interpersonal and intergroup levels of analysis. 
Runciman (1966) broadened the relative deprivation construct by his invaluable 
distinction between egoistic (individual) and fraternal (group) relative deprivation. 
People can believe that they are unfairly personally deprived (individual relative 
deprivation (IRD)) or that a social group to which they belong and identify is 
unfairly deprived (group relative deprivation (GRD). Later Runciman developed 
third concept of relative deprivation – deprivation experienced on behalf of others. 
Concept refers to the feeling of discontent one experiences when perceiving that 
members of another group are unfairly treated. (Walker & Heather, 2002, p. 124) 
The link between group relative deprivation and relative deprivation on behalf of 
others was re-investigated in 2000ies. Feelings of group deprivation had a negative 
impact on deprivation on behalf of others. This is based on an egoistical view of 
human nature: Individuals consider their own interests before those of others. 
Within the context of affirmative action, the gains of one group might be seen as 
losses for another. When a mutually beneficial solution is not believed to be 
feasible, individuals are bound to consider their own interests before those of the 
outgroup (Walker & Heather, 2002, p. 124). 
The concept of relative deprivation and its measurement is also used in the field of 
economics and sociology. Economics focuses on the measurement and 
quantification of relative deprivation using multiple indices of deprivation 
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including the Gini coefficient. An individual’s sentiment of insecurity depends on 
the current wealth level and its variations experienced in the past. The current 
wealth level could also be interpreted as incorporating the individual’s evaluation 
of future prospects. (Bossert & D’Ambrosio, 2013, p. 1017) 
In the field of sociology, Relative Deprivation theory is used to explain the root 
causes of social movements and revolutions. 
We follow the general logic of relative concept and believe that relative deprivation 
worked for Rose Revolution because of existence of two necessary conditions: 
Relative improvement in overall social and economic situation – relative 
deprivation does not work in poorest areas or societies driven by wars and 
conflicts. 
Georgia at the end of 1990s and beginning of 2000s has overcome turbulent years 
of ethnic conflicts and the civil war and was relatively stable. The economy has 
recovered from downturn of 1990s and grew by 11 percent in 2003. 
If tracing GDP annual growth dynamics [Figure 4], in three Post – Soviet 
countries, where acting governments were changed by the Colour Revolutions, 
GDP annual growth was noticeable.1 
 
Figure 4. GDP growth (annual %) 
                                                   
1 World Bank page, accessed: 20.08.2018, http://data.worldbank.org/country/georgia, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine, http://data.worldbank.org/country/kyrgyz-republic. 
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Relative freedom of political activism and expression – Georgia has been 
regarded as semi-free country with rigid elections however with relatively 
functional civil society and media freedom. This relative political freedom 
minimized the individual costs for political participation in Georgia. 
According to the Freedom House “Nations in Transit” report, countries receiving a 
democracy score of 1.00 – 2.99, are Consolidated Democracies, 3.00 – 3.99 – 
Semi – Consolidated Democracies, 4.00 – 4.99 – Transitional or Hybrid 
Regimes, 5.00 – 5.99 – Semi – Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes, 6.00 – 7.00 
– Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes. 
During the pre – revolutionary period in Georgia and Ukraine existing regime type 
was transitional (hybrid) with scores 4.83 and 4.25, while in the Kyrgyz Republic it 
was semi – consolidated authoritarianism with score 5.64. None of those countries 
were rated as consolidated authoritarians. 
In other Post – Soviet countries, the political regime type in Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Russia is consolidated 
authoritarianism, in Armenia semi – consolidated authoritarianism, in Moldova 
between transitional (hybrid) regime and semi – consolidated authoritarianism. 
For our needs, following building assumptions of the relative deprivation are 
relevant: 
Status inconsistency (especially educational and social status) – Status condition, 
especially the role of education vs. status realisation, we believe this is the most 
strong incentive for individuals to participate in mass protest.  We will show that, 
in case of Rose Revolution, many protesters in age group 20 – 30 decided to 
participate in mass protest because they were relatively well educated however, 
they felt that they had very few or almost no chances to promote their carrier and 
social status. We concentrate more on psychological aspects, in other words, 
perceptions of individuals, especially considering past experience of Post-Soviet 
societies, which were formally egalitarian. (Arora, 1971, p. 347)14 
Past conditions vs. expectations – We assume, that for individuals with relative 
high level of education also matters what they expect from taking part in mass 
protests. They perceive that mass protest can change the overall situation and they 
will benefit individually, in other words, they will not be deprived from deserved 
social status. 
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In following chapters, we critically asses the alternative explanations of the Rose 
Revolution showing that existing studies do not touch upon individual motivations 
for participation. 
In next step, we learn why individuals decided to join protests or not to join protest 
by looking at young, educated individuals from Georgia. We have conducted in-
depth interviews and findings are grouped by following groups of individuals: 
group a: those who participated and felt status inconsistency, group b: those who 
participated, but had no feeling of status inconsistency, group c: those who did not 
participate, however had feeling of status inconsistency, group d: those who did not 
participate and had no feeling of status inconsistency. 
Following to the concept of relative deprivation, we anticipated that group b and 
group d would be more common. 
 
2. Georgia Rose Revolution 
2.1. Review of Alternative Explanations 
This part of paper presents alternative explanations about the Georgia Rose 
Revolution and is designed to evaluate the factors which influenced society’s 
decisions during the pre – revolution period in Georgia. 
Regime change may be influenced by internal or external factors. Many current 
studies on this topic review the institutional factors which contribute to regime 
change, while others focus on social factors, such as social transformations. 
Among institutional factors are identified corruption, hybrid regime – the existing 
Shevardnadze regime allowed the public protest to attain its desired results, 
features of the Post – Soviet economy – as a factor, which influenced Colour 
Revolutions, external support, including strengthen civil activism, role of media 
sources. 
By 2003, Georgia seemed to be headed for, if it had not already reached, the status 
of a “failed state”. That year, the influential Corruption Perceptions Index 
maintained by Transparency International (TI) ranked Georgia among the world’s 
most corrupt countries (124th out of 133 surveyed). The index is compiled using 
surveys of businesspeople and others, with the goal of naming what are thought to 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol. 11, no. 2/2018 
   160 
be the most corrupt places to carry on operations. The dim view of Georgia 
expressed in TI’s index put that country in the same dismal vicinity as Angola, 
Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan – all notorious hotbeds of corruption (Kupatadze, 2016, 
p. 110). 
The country was evaluated as a public order with limited access, where 
participation in political process was blocked by poverty, inequality and system 
hierarchy (Jones, 2013). 
Corrupt, semi-criminal government of Shevardnadze and the old Soviet 
nomenklatura he represented which hindered Georgia from advancing towards its 
“destiny.” Armed with the latest political science theories fashionable among 
academic circles in the US as well as Europe, young Georgian students who later 
became key figures in Kmara or the National Movement considered that both 
corruption and inter-ethnic conflicts in Georgia were basically the result of the 
criminalized economy (based on corruption, smuggling and trafficking) that 
overlapped with Shevardnadze’s corrupt regime. (Cheterian, 2008, p. 694) 
Features of the Post – Soviet economy is admitted as a factor, which influenced 
Colour Revolutions. Economic reforms, though disappointing, have also had an 
unexpected and important political impact. Privatization helped to create a class of 
capitalists that has sometimes found itself at odds with venal and covetous state 
officials and irresponsible stewards of the economy. When these new stakeholders 
have perceived that a change in the status quo would benefit them, they have 
formed tactical alliances with opposition activists and parties to help unseat the 
ruling elite. In particular, this materially motivated cohort was a critical but 
underrecognized actor in the mass mobilizations in Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005 – the so – called “Colored Revolutions” 
(Radnitz, 2008, pp. 127 – 128). 
Must take into consideration the external support, which complemented a network 
of NGOs and political activists ready to act in a non – traditional way – they 
challenged the authority of the regime and thought of the best way to adapt the 
imported theories of action to their situation. This political opportunity boosted 
civic activism and was the basis for national and international networks aiming to 
challenge the authorities through domestic and global channels and set up a 
network of trainers in civil disobedience, who are now operating worldwide in 
relative secrecy (Polese & Beachain, 2011, pp. 128 – 129).19 
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All had moral and financial support from external sources, particularly Western 
foundations supporting democratic institutions and processes. A form of “soft” 
political power was utilized by the West to undermine established governments 
(Lane, 2009, p. 115). 
In addition to political support and economic assistance, soon after the 11 
September 2001 attacks, the USA started to provide military assistance to Georgia. 
In 2002 Washington participated in counterterrorism operations and technically 
equipped Georgian troops. This was accompanied by various NGO development 
projects where George Soros’ Open Society Institute (OSI) was a key actor in 
financing the Georgian nongovernmental sector. OSI training in nonviolent protest 
techniques was important against unpopular President Eduard Shevardnadze. 
(Metreveli, 2016, p. 697) 
Media played an important role. Then and always media is under political 
influence. The most influential media source Rustavi 2 supported revolutionary 
forces and somehow gained social support for demonstrations. 
Semi – authoritarian regime gave chance for the government change, in case of 
authoritarian regime and dictatorship, strategy does not work, because strategy was 
based on use of “loopholes” existed during Shevardnadze’s ruling period.122 
From the social determinants studies focus on opposition and Non – Governmental 
Organization role, which managed to assure the society that political protest would 
bring the desired result – a change of government, Western attitudes – countries in 
which elites (or counter-elites) have a strong affinity to the EU or to NATO are 
clearly targets for successful democracy promotion as a form of soft power (Lane, 
2009, p. 130). 
According to some researchers, they are highlighting interaction of several factors, 
such as: The use of stolen elections as the occasion for massive mobilizations 
against pseudo-democratic regimes, Foreign support for the development of local 
democratic movements, The organization of radical youth movements using 
unconventional protest tactics prior to the election in order to undermine the 
regime's popularity and will to repress and to prepare for a final showdown, A 
united opposition established in part through foreign prodding, External diplomatic 
                                                   
1 Author’s (N. Machurshvili) interview with Giorgi Zhghenti. Former Deputy Minister of Georgia of 
IDPs, Accommodation and Refugees. November 2016. Georgia. 
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pressure and unusually large electoral monitoring, Massive mobilization upon the 
announcement of fraudulent electoral results and the use of non violent resistance 
tactics taken directly from the work of Gene Sharp, the guru of non-violent 
resistance in the West (Beissinger, 2007, p. 261). 
During the pre-revolution period, the main mistake committed by the regime in 
Georgia was to have built a weak coercive apparatus. This went along with the 
opposition’s success in finding a charismatic leader, mobilizing the electorate, its 
ability to learn from the Serbians and apply their experience to the Georgian 
context, as well as the coordination with security forces to avoid repression. 
(Polese & Beachain, 2011, p. 123). 
The activities given the popular appellation of “Coloured Revolutions” all had in 
common a proposed socio-political transformation intended to introduce 
“democracy from below”. Although differing in content, they shared a common 
strategy: mass protests occurred within the constitutional framework to widen 
forms of public participation in the regimes: they were legitimated as a movement 
for “greater democracy”, they were all targeted on removing the incumbent 
political leaderships, electoral procedures, allegedly fraudulent, were a regular 
focus for the insurgents, the public gatherings were constituted from a mass base of 
young people, particularly students. In comparison with traditional political 
demonstrations, a novel feature was the orchestration of events through the use of 
modern media technology – mobile phones, the internet and assistance from local 
and foreign media. The demonstrations, in support of a supposedly democratic 
champion, once under way were accompanied to a greater or lesser degree by mass 
cultural events: rock and pop music, which helped mobilize, create solidarity, and 
entertain mass audiences (Lane, 2009, p. 114). 
As for the alternative explanations, part of studies doubt term “Revolution” and 
refer as a revolutionary Coup d’état – change of the political leadership instigated 
by internal or external counter – elites through the agency of mass popular support. 
Such an event has high elite (or counter-elite) participation, and high public (mass) 
involvement but of an “audience” type. The intentions of the insurgents are to 
redress public grievances, to promote the objectives of transformation, and to do 
this through elite renewal, not through the reconstitution of the social economic 
order. Real economic and social grievances about falling living standards, health 
care, distribution of wealth and land, and unemployment may underpin the protests 
for the mass participants (Lane, 2009, p. 119) 
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“Mass participation” should not be conflated into “people’s democracy 
promotion”: such participation might be motivated by other grievances – of a 
regional, ethnic, class or generational kind – or it may be emotional or mercenary. 
(Lane, 2009, p. 121) 
Former deputy minister of Georgia of IDPs, Accommodation and Refugees admits, 
that so called “Rose Revolution” was necessary transformation for country, but did 
not have signs of revolution, it was development step. For some forces it was 
important to call revolution, in terms of PR. Georgia faced social-political 
problems, which would bring country to real revolution in 1-2 years, if November 
2003 demonstrations did not end successfully.129 
The Rose Revolution also is admitted as a symbolic revolt against the legacy of 
Soviet rule and that of Shevardnadze (Cheterian, 2008, p. 693). 
Georgians had complaints with Shevardnadze, when he arrived in Georgia, people 
were optimistic, afterwards could not got rid of him. Shevardnadze was 
characterized creating illusions, that everything in country went right way. People 
called Georgia “failing state”, sometimes “failed state”.2 31 
In order to answer the question - why social mobilization occurred in Georgia for 
the pre - revolutionary period, one of the central issue among accompanying social, 
cultural, and political consequences is to explain Georgians attitudes towards 
participation in social movements. 
Caucasus Barometer is an annual survey about socio-economic issues and political 
attitudes conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) in the 
three countries of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
Representative nationwide data is available since 2008. 
According to the data taken from Caucasus Barometer, [Figure 5] represents 
distribution on question – should people participate in protest actions?3 32 
                                                   
1 Author’s (N. Machurshvili) interview with Giorgi Zhghenti. Former Deputy Minister of Georgia of 
IDPs, Accommodation and Refugees. November 2016. Georgia. 
2 Author’s (N. Machurshvili) interview with Archil Abashidze. Ilia State University Professor. 
November 2016. Georgia. 
3 Caucasus Research Resource Center page, accessed: 20.08.2018, 
http://caucasusbarometer.org/ge/cb-ge/PROTEST/. 
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Figure 5. Should People Participate in Protest Actions? (%) 
If analysing survey data, majority of respondents support participation in public 
protest. 
For research purposes, average income is used as data on society satisfaction. The 
area between the GDP Per Capita and average income lines is an area of collective 
relative deprivation. The average income coefficient is measured by the formula: 
μ = (1 − G) 
µ - is average income coefficient, G - is Gini coefficient. 
Average income is a multiplication of GDP Per Capita and average income 
coefficient (µ). 
GDP Per capita and Gini coefficient data are taken from the World Bank database.1 
[Figure 6] shows data of satisfaction of society in Georgia for the 1996-2003 
period. 
Gap between GDP Per Capita and average income is an area of deprivation. 
                                                   
1 World Bank page, accessed 20.08.2018, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=GE; 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=GE 




Figure 6. Data of Satisfaction of Society in Georgia for the 1996 - 2003 Period (USD) 
2.2. Interview Interpretation – Empirical Findings 
Interviews were collected during the period November 2016 – February 2017. 
Interview questionnaire aimed recovery of situation in Georgia for the pre – 
revolutionary period (before November 2003) using projective techniques. First 
part of questionnaire concerns information about respondent; second part of 
questionnaire aims to find out if respondent participated in demonstrations; third 
part of questionnaire is about recovery respondent’s memories on protest dynamics 
and expectations during and after revolution. Respondent’s age range is between 20 
– 30 years for the research period and are divided on following groups: 
Group a: Respondents, who participated in demonstrations, feeling of status 
inconsistency, both actual and expectation (3 Respondent); 
Group b: Respondents, who participated in demonstrations, no feeling of status 
inconsistency, both actual and expectation (3 Respondent); 
Group c: Respondents, who do not participated in demonstrations, feeling of status 
inconsistency, both actual and expectation (6 Respondent); Two respondents under 
Group c were abroad during the Rose Revolution; 
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Group d: Respondents, who do not participated in demonstrations, no feeling of 
status inconsistency, both actual and expectation (1 Respondent). 
Two respondents under Group a were students and one new graduate, working as 
financial manager. They did not admit themselves realized and were skeptical 
towards professional development perspective, as advancement was restricted by 
the nepotism – everyone worked there, where they had relatives or friends, or could 
pay bribe, those, who had opportunity, left country. 
1990ies respondents remember as a period, when people had to fight for survival. 
After 2002 local election new political force appeared, which announced new ideas 
and became bright spot, people saw in Saakashvili person, who would deal with 
existing situation, when he was Minister of Justice and than Chair of Tbilisi City 
Council, he disclosed corrupted politicians, he spoke language, that people 
understand and they followed him. 
Respondents participated in demonstrations with their friends, family 
memberseither with Zhvanias’ political party members, because admitted, that 
Zhvania’s party was able to deal with problems existing in Georgia, although part 
of them did not expect political sympathy to any party, just admitted necessary 
government change. Reason of civil involvement was disorder, negative charge in 
population, restrictive situation, where 2 or 3 percent of population was satisfied, 
also, election result fraudulent brought people out in the streets. Respondents never 
doubt their decision about joining demonstrations. 
Till 2008 development was visible, as for the expectations, idealism is utopia, 
Saakashvili’s government partially replied society demand, but nepotism problem 
remained with human rights violation and torture, even in 2012 government was 
changed through the election, but uninvestigated murders remained black mark. 
Respondents under Group b participated in demonstrations, but as they mentioned, 
did not experience status inconsistency. One of respondent was PhD graduated 
from European University and worked for the international organization in 
Georgia, another studies in Aspirantura and was lecturing in private University, 
third worked in NGO as a board chair. 
As for the characterization pre – revolutionary period, respondents mention 
corruption, power shortages, defective infrastructure, system based on corruption, 
poverty, by economic and political means, foreign course was not defined, state 
system was on clan level, may people worked somewhere, but salary was too low 
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and they had to work on three or four places to survival, either accept bribe. It was 
difficult to find job in state institution in spite of the fact, that for the period of 
2000ies Western educated people in Georgia were few. 
Respondents joined demonstrations either with colleagues, either were involved in 
organizational issues, without affiliation to any political force, they voiced civil 
position and did not support any political force. As Saakashvili conceded later, 
National Movement had 27 percent of votes, but it seemed, that they should receive 
90 percent, they should take first place, people needed spark to join demonstrations 
and parliamentary election was spark, as living conditions were degrading. To call 
November 2003 events “Revolution” gave possibility to scroll from the rule of law, 
for example, without “revolution” it is not possible to dismiss judges, but when 
government is revolutionary, poses more instruments. As for the demonstrations, 
Georgians remember civil war and were trying to avoid confrontation, everyone 
argued, that system change was necessary, some people, including respondents 
several friends, because of their job did not join demonstrations, but supported. 
Everyone aware, that country was deadlocked. 
As for the revolution results, corruption on lower level, infrastructural problems 
were solved, but at some point revolution devours its children. 
Following six respondents under Group c did not participate in demonstrations, 
but felt status inconsistency. Two representatives of Group c were abroad during 
the demonstrations. 
Four respondents were students; one new graduate, who was employed in law 
office of his professor; one respondent was parliament staff for the pre-
revolutionary period. As respondent mentioned, employment in public service was 
restricted by patronage; Respondents, who were abroad for the revolution period, 
left Georgia and hoped, that before coming back something may be changed. They 
could not participated in demonstration, as were abroad, if they were in Georgia, 
they would definitely join public protest. Respondents mention Rustavi 2 as a main 
source of information. 
Beginning of 2000ies respondents evaluate politically and socially undefined 
period, political situation was negatively stable and frozen. People tried not to go 
outside late in the evening fearing robbery and criminal. It seemed two extreme 
attitudes – Some were happy with their status, which were well adapted to situation 
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and second part of the population unhappy, resentful. Besides difficult social living 
conditions, respondents mention corruption and stagnation in every direction. 
2000ies was the period of total hopelessness and feeling that state was destroyed. 
Every direction was frozen and stagnated, without radical changes state system 
would be destroyed. In courtyards dealers were selling drugs, young people in 
Georgia, without so called “influential protector” had no chance for the career 
advancement, they had to undertake “dirty work” for the minimal salary. 
Corruption, economic stagnation and feeling that achieve something was 
impossible, covered country. Existed common wish to change something at least. 
As for the reason why respondents did not participate in demonstration, one 
respondent lived in Rustavi (town in Georgia, near Tbilisi) and there was not any 
kind of social activities, but supported, for information respondent was watching 
Rustavi 2, second respondent did not participate in street protest, because admits, 
that government change through the violent means, including street protest, is a 
restriction for the development and those, who participated in street protest, their 
goal was to achieve personal benefits, other respondents felt hopeless, either did 
not participate because of family skeptical position, one respondent towards 
revolution had ambivalent attitudes – on the one hand – wish to escape from 
swamp and second, respondent knew some revolutionary leaders and had negative 
impression, Saakashvili seemed to him as an authoritarian. Liberty Institute had 
plan, according to which, in 2003 demonstration should be started, expectation was 
not government change, but to weaken Shevardnadze regime, “Citizen’s Union” 
could not participate in next election and Zhvania would won, National Movement 
would become oppositional political force, plan was till 2008, respondent has read 
extracts from this document, but did not know its role, but knew about expected 
demonstrations in advance. Respondent did not expect that Shevardnadze would 
leave government, expectation that National Movement would come in 
government, came later, because they did not have large number of electorate 
outside Tbilisi. 
In 2005 Liberty Institute published Samuel Huntingtons’ article, according to 
which, anticorruption revolutions are not precondition for democratizations, thus, 
respondent did not have outstanding expectations. Revolutionary leaders did not 
have confidence with each other to set any common plans. He was collecting 
interviews for his Masters’ thesis, when he interviewed respondents from 
revolutionary political forces, all of them thought that he was sent to provoke. 
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As for the outcomes, there were two moments, dissatisfaction on a low level – for 
example, power shortages, corruption, which was solved, on the other hand – 
decision making in narrow circle, which remained after revolution. Rose 
Revolution resulted for example, ageism, in this case, respondent was beneficial, 
he began to work in university, but for example, on his family, influenced 
negatively, old generation in several cases had to end their career. 
Besides that strong state institutions were created, there was no balance between 
media, government, parliament and justice system. For the post – revolution 
period, during three years reforms were implemented, afterwards reforms were 
stopped, in some cases government kept results, in some cases stepped back. 
Before 2008 Russia – Georgia war, majority of positive reforms were 
implemented, respondents did not remember any large – scale reform for the 
following period. Another respondent concludes, that some forces, with political 
interests, in order to receive political benefits, used social groups, who suffered 
poverty and restriction. 
Respondent under Group d did not participate in demonstrations, as she 
mentioned, did not feel status inconsistency. For the research period respondent 
lived and studied in Zugdidi (town in the Western Georgia, bordered by Abkhazia), 
family was not able to support her study in Tbilisi and she had to work. Young 
people was not able to pay university fees, people could not afford minimal living 
conditions. Respondent’s friends were from the “Citizen’s Union” local 
organization. 
Respondent did not participated in demonstrations because expected violence from 
the government’s side, also, admits that revolution does not bring evolution. 
Respondent did not like Shevardnadze, but could bear one year to avoid violence. 
If after Shevardnadze resignation Saakashvili, Burjanadze or Zhvania would not 
come in government, or Shevardnadze would  leave power without using violence, 
respondent may join demonstrations. Expectation was rapid development, which 
was strengthen by the George Bush visit in Georgia, actually, it happened so. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to evaluate role of political and material deprivation for 
the social mobilization during the Rose Revolution in Georgia in the framework of 
Relative Deprivation theory, based on data, collected through interviews with 
respondents unified under four group. 
The summarizing task, divided into two parts, will reconnect the theoretical 
conclusions and generalize interview findings. 
In the empirical part of the paper, it has become clear that Relative Deprivation 
theory adequately explains reasons beyond social mobilization during the Georgia 
Rose Revolution. Shevardnadze government allowed social protest to bring about 
the desired result – regime change – considering the theoretical assumption that 
countries with authoritarian political regime give less opportunity for society’s 
protest to bring about the desired result. 
Respondents evaluated 1990ies Georgia as a period of nepotism and bribery, 
poverty by economic and political means, when people had to fight for survival. 
Period was characterized by populism, therefor, Saakashvili spoke language that 
people understand. Respondents despite of sympathy to any political force, 
participated in demonstrations because of status inconsistency, fraudulent election 
became just spark. Those, who did not participate, were either skeptical towards 
demonstration idea or towards oppositional political forces. Respondents 
mentioned division between social groups, those, who were adapted with situation, 
were satisfied and others had to struggle for survival. During the pre – 
revolutionary period, role of media, specifically Rustavi 2 was highlighted. 
Western funded NGOs such as Liberty Institute through its youth organization 
Kmara elaborated strategy for social protest. 
Revolutionary political forces leaders personality was also crucial for those 
respondents, who decided to refrain from participation in demonstrations. 
Majority of respondents support idea of Coup D’etat. Term “Revolution” just gave 
possibility to scroll from the rule of law. 
The calculation of the collective relative deprivation gap between average income 
and society satisfaction shows that the existing material deprivation was sufficient 
to trigger social protest. 
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Corruption and deprivation of political participation between the society groups 
contributed to the formation of the nongovernmental sector. Western-educated 
Georgian citizens, whose participation in decision making was restricted by the 
corrupted state system, managed to assure society, who experienced material 
deprivation and for whom, taking into consideration Soviet past, inequality was 
unacceptable, that political protest would cause regime change. 
As a conclusion with regard to the empirical part, several considerations can be 
made: together with political and material deprivation, there were other factors that 
influenced the former, such as the lack of the rule of law, corruption and the rigged 
election. During the evaluation of foreign influence, it is important to mention the 
support for strengthening the capacity of non-state actors, which had an important 
role in mobilizing society. The acting authority let the social protest bring the 
desired result – the change of regime. 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that, over twelve years, Gamsakhurdia’s and 
Shevardnadze’s policies brought segregation to society and did not contribute to 
the reduction of the economic and ideological gap between social groups, nor could 
they ensure wider social participation in political decision-making, but if we take 
into account the number of elections held in Georgia since its independence, there 
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